Monday, 2 March 2020

Parshat Zachor: Choice in Destruction

Originally published 3/18/11, 9:58 am.
This article originally appeared in Nishma Update, March 1992 and is also available on the Nishma website.

Choice in Destruction

In Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzva Asseh 187Rambam, when describing the command to destroy the Seven Nations that inhabited Canaan, uses the verb le'harog, to kill. The Chinuch, Mitzva 425, is similar. Yet both authors in describing the mitzva to destroy Amalek apply a different language. The command is to destroy the zerah, the progeny of Amalek and, what seems to be even of greater significance, to eradicate any memory of Amalek from this world. In Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 5:5, in codifying this law, Maimonides only mentions this latter part although in the Sefer HaMitzvot he mentions the first. What significance is there to this change in language? What is the actual essence of the mitzva

To answer these questions, at least according to the view of Rambam, it is necessary to look at a most controversial law that Maimonides codifies in Hilchot Melachim 6:1-4. According to Rambam, the Jewish nation's obligation to make peace before going to war applies even to battles with the Seven Nations and Amalek. How does this reconcile with the mitzvot regarding the destruction of these nations? The language of the Kesef Mishna is most revealing. While Ra'avad and others state that this agreement of peace must include the observance of the Seven Noachide Laws on the part of these nations, the Kesef Mishna presents a most interesting reason why - " for if they accept the Seven Noachide Laws they leave the category of the Seven Nations and Amalek and they are like bnei Noach ha'kesharim, righteous non-Jews". In terms of the Seven Nations, the mitzva is now fully understandable. The command is to kill the members of these nations, as Rambam states in Sefer HaMitzvot, they are the root of idolatry. Once someone accepts, however, the Noachide Code, they are no longer a member of these nations that are the root of idolatry and therefore there is no command to kill this individual ( in fact this would be prohibited just as it is prohibited to kill any non-Jew ). How, though, does one understand the mitzva regarding Amalek? 

On the surface the answer seems to be simple - the command regarding Amalek should be similar. The language in the Mishneh Torah and Sefer HaMitzvot however must lead to a different conclusion. Regarding the Seven Nations, the command is to kill them. If, however, the Seven Nations do not exist, because of something such as acceptance of the Noachide Code, then this mitzva cannot be performed. Encouraging the members of the Seven Nations to accept the Noachide Code may be praiseworthy and a part of the command to first reach out for peace, but it is not part of this mitzva - the language is clear. Regarding Amalek, however, the command is to destroy its memory, its progeny, its essence - its name. It would seem that any transformation of someone out of the category of Amalek would fulfil this mitzva of destroying this entity. I would argue, though, that the mitzva can only be fulfilled if the member of Amalek converts to become a Jew. While acceptance of the Noachide Code takes someone out of the category of Amalek and, as such, there is no command to destroy this individual, this acceptance would not utterly destroy the Amalek concept from this world. A subsequent rejection of the Seven Noachide Mitzvot, it would seem, could lead to this individual being re-classified as Amalek. Acceptance of the Noachide Code would simply, as in the case of the Seven Nations, mean there is no command to destroy this individual while he is in this state of a kosher Ben Noach. Amalek, however, is not fully destroyed. Becoming a Jew and receiving that classification, however, is irrevocable. As Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 13:17, even if a convert returns to idolatry, this person is still classified as a Jew. Conversion would destroy the Amalek name and as such would seem to be a method to fulfil this mitzva

The irony in this approach to the command is that attempting to do the mitzva in this way, through gerut, would seem to be a full rectification of the original mistake that led to the creation of Amalek. In T.B. Tractate Sanhedrin 99b, we are told that the creation of Amalek was a punishment in that our Avot, Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaacov, did not accept Timna, the mother of Amalek, as a ger. Is it not a Divine paradox in that we may fulfil a mitzva through the conversion of her children? 

The major problem with this approach, however, is the Mechilta, Shemot 17:16, which declares that gerim, converts, from Amalek are not to be accepted. The Mechilta actually seems to imply that even a process of conversion would be inapplicable for David killed the Amalekite convert - a member of Amalek simply cannot convert. Rambam, however, does not codify this law when he discusses those who can or cannot convert in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah, chapter 12. Maimonides' non-acceptance of the Mechilta is further substantiated in that in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:6 he refers to the case of the Amalekite convert as an example of the Jewish king's power of summary judgement. The major issue with the Mechilta actually arises from T.B. Tractate Gittin 57b and Tractate Sanhedrin 96b which declares that the descendants of Haman ( who is considered an Amalekite) learned Torah in B'nei Brak. If Amalekites cannot convert, how could Haman's descendants have become Jews? While some commentators reconcile the Mechilta and the Talmud through maintaining the bar on Amalekite conversion, there are others who declare the Mechilta's position not to be universal. See Torah Shelaima, Parshat Beshalach, section 185 and, for greater detail, Sefer Ner L'Meah. It would seem that Maimonides would be classified within the latter. While converting Amalek may not be an option in fulfilling the mitzva to all, it would seem to be a feasible method according to Rambam, and one that many may find more tenable.

Sunday, 1 March 2020

Parsha: Tetzaveh, "Sh'qalim and Zachor"


Question:
When do we read both Parshat Sh'qalim and Parshat Zachor on the very same Shabbat?

Answer:
When Tetzaveh is Zachor - the most common case - we read Sh'qalim at Mincha time.

Shalom,
RRW

Tetzaveh: One Action; Opposite Meanings

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Tetzaveh and the topic is the nazir and the kohain. While there is similarity in many of the laws that apply to these two individuals, there are also differences. One, for example, lets his/hair grow, the other has limitations on letting the hair grow -- the term, though, kadosh still applies to both. It would seem that actions may have multiple meanings and that similar meanings may even result from divergent and opposite actions.

 We invite you to further considerate this idea by reading an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5761-32.htm.

Saturday, 22 February 2020

Parsha: Terumah, Shekalim, "Shekalim vs. Terumah"

originally posted Feb. 14, 2015

What's the difference between Shekalim and the collection in Parshat Terumah?

In Terumah, it's "n'div libbo." That's a free will offering. Sh'qalim is level, "heoshir lo yarbeh..."
L'mah haddavar domeh? To what may this be compared?


T'rumah is like a building fund - everyone gives according to his means, while Sheqalim is like dues, where each gives equally.

Please embellish this and use it to spread some good Torah.

Shalom,
RRW

Beyond Tzedakah: Understanding the Torah Expenditure

As we study Parshat Terumah this week, it is also important to gain an understanding of the broader context of tzedakah in general. We thus direct you to the following article on the Nishma website:

P. Trumah: Tzedakah is a Mirror of the Divine

Rav Eliyahu Safran:

«As we've noted, God is not asking for the Children of Israel to make an offering because He requires it. God has no need for the people's largesse? To suggest otherwise is to diminish God. And yet, God's command remains. So, if God is not asking for an offering for His own sake, what is He asking for?»

Trumah: Tzedakah is a Mirror of the Divine - Judaism - Israel National News

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/12874


Stay HAPPY My Friends

R Eliyahu Safran: Parshas Terumah - To Hold a Mirror Up to the Divine

«One thing we should be able to say of all mitzvot  is that their performance benefits us, not God.  For, after all, what does God need from us?  God, Sovereign of the Universe, does not depend upon us, we depend upon Him.  That is plain.  But what then does God mean when He commands Moses, "Speak to the Children of Israel, that they shall take for me an offering."»
Parshas Terumah - To Hold a Mirror Up to the Divine - Tzedakah and Gemilut Chasadim
http://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=57584

BJL Mobile | Parshas Terumah - To Hold a Mirror Up to the Divine - Tzedakah and Gemilut Chasadim
http://baltimorejewishlife.com/m/news/article.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=57584


Kol Tuv,
RRW

Saturday, 15 February 2020

Parsha: Mishpatim, "Following the Majority Opinion"



Mishpatim: Following the Majority Opinion

A story about Rabbi Akiva, when the famed second century Talmudic sage was a young scholar...

Rabban Gamliel, the head of Sanhedrin, hosted a gathering of scholars in the town of Jericho. The guests were served dates, and Rabban Gamliel honored Rabbi Akiva with reciting the brachah achronah (final blessing). However, Rabban Gamliel and the other sages disagreed about which blessing should be said after eating dates. The young scholar quickly made the blessing - in accordance with the opinion of the other rabbis.
"Akiva!" exclaimed Rabban Gamliel. "When will you stop butting your head into Halachic disagreements?"
"Our master," Rabbi Akiva replied calmly, "it is true that you and your colleagues disagree in this matter. But did you not teach us that the Law is decided according to the majority opinion?" [Brachot 37a]
In truth, it is hard to understand Rabban Gamliel's criticism. What did he expect Rabbi Akiva to do? Why was he upset?
Two Methods to Resolve Disputes

In order to resolve legal disputes, there are two methods a scholar may use to decide which opinion should be accepted as law.

The first way is to conduct an extensive analysis of the subject to find out the truth. We examine the issue at hand, weighing the reasoning and supporting proofs for each view, until we can determine which opinion is the most logical.
However, if we are unable to objectively decide which opinion is more substantiated, we fall back on the second method. Instead of the truth, we look for consensus. We follow the majority opinion - not because it is more logical or well-reasoned - but out of the simple need to establish a normative position and avoid disagreement and conflict. If we are seeking consensus and peace, then the most widely held opinion is the preferred one.

Rabban Gamliel was critical of Rabbi Akiva because he thought the young scholar had had the audacity to decide which opinion was the correct one. Therefore he castigated him, "When will you stop butting your head into these legal disagreements?" In other words, where did you get the idea that you could use your head - your own powers of logic and reasoning - to decide issues that are beyond your expertise and knowledge?

Rabbi Akiva responded that he hadn't presumptuously tried to decide which opinion is correct. Rather, he had simply applied the second method of resolving a legal dispute: deciding the issue by consensus, according to the majority opinion.

- [adapted from Ein Ayah vol. II, p. 176]


Shalom,

RRW

P. Mishpatim - Midrasho vs. P'shuto

See Mishpatim 21:28
Rashi: "Baal Hashor Nakki"

The Halachah is "Midrasho"
P'shuto is something else.
So - as per Rashi - a Halachic translation here would be "al pi midrash, even though it is based upon Midrash Halachah and not upon Midrash Aggadah.  P'shat - while not anti-Halachic - does not [necessarily] imply the Halachot derived here.

Shalom
RRW

Parshas Mishpatim: There Are No "Alternative Facts"

From RRW
We would like to blog Rabbi Eliyahu Safran on the parsha. Hope you enjoy

Baltimore Jewish Life | Parshas Mishpatim: There Are No "Alternative Facts"

P. Mishpatim 1 - "Et Ishti" The Question

Originally published 1/27/11, 9:01 am.
I posted the following in the Leining discussion group:

See Shemot: 21:5 "et ishti."
Rashi - [namely] the shifchah.
Rashi makes perfect sense because, after all,  his regular wife goes out with him...
My query is about the term ISHTI. How is this applicable to a woman who is not his lawfully wedded wife, and is merely given over to produce children for the Adon?
The terminology ISHTI seems a bit strange because she never really belongs to this eved Ivri in the first place.
Any suggestions?

Shalom,
RRW

P. Mishpatim 2 - "Et Ishti" The Answer

I received this answer
From Gershon Eliyahu
Aka
Giorgies E. Kepipesiom


«For that matter, bonay is equally troublesome, as the children are not legally his sons, they are the adon's property, they have no yichus to the eved ivri, for example, if he later dies leaving no other children alive, these do not exempt his lawful wife from yibbum or chalitza.

My guess: the key word is "ahavti". True, she is not his, and not his wife. But he has fallen in love with this woman and these children. He is using the possessive forms ishti, bonay, in the sense of "I love this woman as if she were my wife, I love these children as if they were my own sons.

GEK»

I said "this makes sense to me" and I received GEK's permission to share.

Shalom
RRW

Mishpatim: Understanding Torah

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Mishpatim and the topic is mitzvot we understand and mitzvot we don't understand. Most significantly, what we understand may actually change over time. Certain laws which were presented as understandable in the past are now deemed not understandable. And other laws which were described as beyond human comprehension in the past are now seen as making sense. What does this indicate about the human interaction with Torah? We invite you to look at an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5755-13.htm.

Sunday, 9 February 2020

Parsha: Yitro, "Navol Tibbol", Torah as a Co-operative Venture

originally published on 1/12/14

Let's recall Yitro's Mussar to Moshe Rabbenu. Moshe Rabbenu himself couldn't handle the sheer volume of Bnei Yisrael's legal cases without a ranked system of judges beneath him. 

We can easily understand why it's necessary for "G'dolim" to address knotty issues like agunot, defining death, etc. Yet if Moshe Rabbenu  couldn't manage it all,  then al achat kama vakammah, g'dolim today could be overwhelmed too! If it were required that each Rav master every Halachic complexity, then everyone, individually, would face "navol tibbol."  We'd be overwhelmed by the Yam Hatalmud, and Pos'qim, Chas v'Shalom

So it's mistavra that the role of Sarei alafim etc. is just as vital to avoiding "navol tibbol" as Moshe's own role on the top of the pyramid. Local Rabbonim, G'dolim, and any "vaad" or Dayan in between, all play necessary roles in this legal mechanism.Therefore, all levels really need each other. Recall, no one Jew can do all 613 Mitzvot! 


It seems this is the Mussar Heskel from our Parshah: Torah is a co-operative venture


Shalom,
RRW

Yitro: Emunah

Originally posted Jan. 23, 2016
 
From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Yitro and the topic is emunah, which is generally translated as faith or trust. The question of how to translate the word actually reflects an issue involved in understanding the word. Is emunah something we control or is it a natural response of one's being? We invite you to look at an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5754-17.htm.

Parsha: Yitro, "2,000 Years Without Torah"

originally published on 1/12/14

Someone recently asked me the following question:

If the Torah is the guidebook for life, how could humanity have survived without this guidebook for 2000 years? In other words, why did God wait for 2000 years before giving the Torah?

I look forward to the ideas and to the discussion in your comments.

Shalom,
Rabbi Ben Hecht

P. Yitro - Last 3 Mitzvot, the Questions

Originally posted Jan. 23, 2016

 There are 3 mitzvot at the end of P. Yitro that are wedged in between the end of the 10 Dibrot and P. Mishpatim.
What are they?
What underlying theme connects these three together?
Hint: one is explicit, the other 2 are only subtly connected.

Shalom,
RRW

P. Yitro - Last 3 Mitzvot, the Answers

Originally posted Jan. 23, 2016

The 3 mitzvot are
1 "Lo Ta'asoon iti ...elohei chessef..."
2. "Mizbach adama.." thru "ki charb'cha..."
3. "V'lo ta'aleh b'ma'alot...Asher lo tiggaleh ervatcha..."

The common thread?
1. Idol Worship
2. Murder [charbecha]
3. Gilluy Arayot [explicitly so]

These constitute the 3 "cardinal sins" - albeit the last two are "subtle / abbizraihu" cases related specifically to the Mizbei'ach.

Shalom
RRW

Parsha: Yitro - How to Divide the Asseret Haddibrot?

originally posted January 23, 2013

How are the "10 Commandments" to be parsed [i.e. enumerated into different commandments] according to:

A. Hazal?

B and C. The Masoretic text?
[two different answers]

D. R Wolf Heidenheim? -

Wolf Heidenheim - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolf_Heidenheim



-----------------------------------------
Shalom and Best Regards,
RRW

MISTAKES are always forgivable
If you have the courage to admit them.

Yitro: The Flow of Sinai

Originally published 2/13/09, 11:45 AM.

To many, the goal of religion is to attain a greater and greater religious or spiritual experience. Within the realm of Torah, though, the Jewish nation has already reached the pinnacle of religious experiences, the Revelation at Sinai. So what then is the Jewish religious experience or process through life?

Rabbi Hecht addresses this issue in an Insight from 5758 available at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5758-13.htm