Parsha: Bo, "Rashi on P'shat and D'rash"

originally posted January 9, 2016

Rashi D"H V'im yim'at habbayyit...(Bo 12:4 )

First, Rashi says, "X l'fee f'shuto..." Namely, if there aren't enough people to completely eat the Pesach lamb, and they will come to have Nottar, then these people are to join their neighbors.

V'od yeish bo Midrash: "That following 'shenimnu' they may still withdraw whilst the lamb still lives". Rashi does NOT force the P'shat to conform to D'rash EVEN when that D'rash is Halachic and not Aggadic.

Thus, P'shat of a phrase can be independent of the Halachot derived from it . Even though the p'shat here IS influenced by Halachah. It conforms to an explicit text concerning Nottar. Although we can't be certain, it doesn't seem to CONTRADICT halachah either! 

Summary:

While Rashi does suggest that P'shat conforms with Halachah,  he also mentions that Halachic D'rash adds a dimension that goes well beyond P'shat.

Shalom,

RRW

Parsha: Lech Lecha, "Leaving Israel"

In  Mishna Torah: Hilchot Melachim: 5:9, the Rambam writes that:


"Even though it was a famine and one is permitted to leave Israel [nevertheless] "einah middat hassidut" ... [It is not the mark of a pious character]
And because of that Machalon and Kilyon - 2 "gedolei hador" [great ones of their generation] ..left and were liable to destruction by "the Maqom".

Questions:
1. If it's Halachically permitted to leave the land of Israel, then who cares about "Middat Hassidut"?

2 If all Jews are on the same level of obligation and liability, then how does being a "Gadol Hador" change someone's level?

3. If even the Rambam concedes that Machalon and Kilyon's leaving Eretz Yisrael was Halachically permitted, then why did he say they were punished? 

4. In Lech L'cha, Avraham Avinu left the Holy Land under similar circumstances - and he seemed to be rewarded and not punished! How does this Rambam address that case?

For further sources

• Torah Temimah on Lech L'cha 12:10 quoting Bava Qama 60b
• Note 13 quoting Bava Batra 91a

Shalom, RRW

Parsha: Shoftim, "To King or Not to King"

Canadians will undoubtedly favour the Royalist Position whilst Americans will surely prefer the Republican Position!

The Torah states that: when you [Bnei Yisrael] ask for a KING,  "'I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are round about me" (Devarim: 17:14) you shall surely place one - Even [or especially] when asking to be like the surrounding nations.

Sh'muel [with Hashem's approbation] protests that his people requested a King just like "the Goyim." (Shmuel I 8:5).

Shmuel's protestations all make sense if our Sidrah-Parsha is stating that this royal appointment is optional and subjunctive to a request. In that case, the objection was to the request for appointing a King. Once requested, it must be fulfilled,  according to the law in our Parshah.

However, Rambam Sefer Hamitzvot et. al. states that a king is a requirement.  This implies that the request is also obligatory. Sh'muel's protests then seem difficult to fathom.

I have some answers but I was wondering what you readers might say?

Shalom,

RRW

Liturgical Parallels between Tisha B'Av and Purim

Previously posted around Tisha b'av 2009, then reposted March 6, 2011, on Nishmablog.


The following outline lists some of the parallels, primarily liturgical, between Purim and the 9th of Av.

           
1 Maariv - Nighttime 
     A. Only Megillos that are read at night.
          - Eicho
          - Esther
     B. Similar Structure with Kaddish Tiskabel and v'Ato Kodosh

2 Shacharis - Omissions
     A.  Purim - A "miracle" Holiday , no Hallel (Megilloh instead)
     B.  9th of Av -  A Fast Day  without   
          -  Selichos (Kinnos instead)
          -  Tachanun & Ovinu Malkeinu

3 Shacharis - Chazoros Hashatz
     A. Only weekday repetitions of the Amido having Krovos/Krovatz 

at least in the common Ashkenaz / Yekke Litrugy
4 Preceding Shabbos 
     A. Purim preceded by Zachor
     B. 9th of Av preceded by Chazon

5 The Tanach's Pattern - Special Torah and Haftoro readings are read on the Shabbos 

before the event, with the corresponding Megilloh on the day of the event.
     A. Purim - The Amalek Connection
          -  Torah- Zachor 
          -  Navi - Haftoro of Zachor (Shaul's War with Amalek in Shmuel)
          -  Kesuvim Esther
     B. 9 Av - The  Eicho Connection
          -  Torah - Eicho in Devorim
          -  Navi - Eicho in the Haftoro of Chazon (Yeshaya)
          -  Kesuvim - Eicho

6. Month-wide 
     A. Mishenichnos Adar Marbin b'Simcho
     B. Mishenichnos Av M'maatin b'Simcho

7. Miscellaneous
     A. Some Pesukim in Esther are read to Eicho's melody (in particular Asher 
 Heglo)
     B. Chiyuv S'eudo vs. Chiyuv Taanis
     C. Similar Minhogim not to work

Shalom,
RRW

Parsha: Shemini, "Asher Lo Tsivah"

Pick your preferred parshanut.  

Parshanut suggests three translations of the phrase, "Asher Lo Tzivah" (Vayikra: 10:1) There is basically a 2-way split concerning Nadav and Avihu (N&A) and their eish zara. The first two schools may help start a future Nishmablog poll, BE"H, though the third school is kinda' tangential.

1. "They were commanded NOT"  N&A were actually seeking to grow spiritually through transgressing the commandment NOT to bring such an eish zarah [Tur et. Al.] It literally went up in flames  Don't serve Hashem by violating protocol
2.  "They were NOT commanded" - N&A added on an extra embellishments. They acted excessively "frum"  and their zeal was their sin in their spiritual approach. This idea is very popular among Left-wing circles. Don't be mosif "humrot". [Bal tosif. Al t'hee tzaddiq harbei] 
3. This explanation can work for either side of the split. Since N&A brought ersatz K'toret, they were left unprotected to eish Hashem and vulnerable to a form of spiritual "radiation."  Their action was not so much a sin as a failure to use real Ketoret. It was what they failed to do which allowed them to get burnt. [See Haforah of Uzah]. Genuine Ketoret was tantamount to a radiation suit; don't play with the rules lest you risk exposure.

Let me tell a related story.  
There once lived a woman looking to add a spiritual dimension to her avodah. A Great Gadol, "Moshe," asked her to experiment by wearing a four-cornered garment without tzitzit. She felt exhilirated. 

Moshe exclaimed, "For three months, you have been wearing a garment without any religious or halachic value, it is thus clear that your feeling comes from a source outside of the Mitzvah", and he [Moshe] did not grant her permission to wear a Talit " [Source?]

To which Avodah's R Micha Berger protested:

We do many things that come from sources outside the mitzvah. "Hinei Keil yeshuasi" before Havdalah, for example. The particular patterns of hand washing most qehillos use for neigl vasr or before hamotzi. Qabbalas Shabbos. Etc, etc, etc... Why is this woman wanting to do something that makes her feel connected to the Borei valueless just because it is non-halachic? Would this Gadol "Moshe" have given the same advice to NCSY and tell them to stop doing kumzitzin or a pre-havdalah "ebbing" for an hour? [Source??]

This offers us a segue towards a poll on valid paths to spirituality in Judaism. Which guidelines are permitted or desirable?

Shalom, 
RRW

Parsha: Mishpatim, "Following the Majority Opinion"

Mishpatim: Following the Majority Opinion

A story about Rabbi Akiva, when the famed second century Talmudic sage was a young scholar...

Rabban Gamliel, the head of Sanhedrin, hosted a gathering of scholars in the town of Jericho. The guests were served dates, and Rabban Gamliel honored Rabbi Akiva with reciting the brachah achronah (final blessing). However, Rabban Gamliel and the other sages disagreed about which blessing should be said after eating dates. The young scholar quickly made the blessing - in accordance with the opinion of the other rabbis.

"Akiva!" exclaimed Rabban Gamliel. "When will you stop butting your head into Halachic disagreements?"

"Our master," Rabbi Akiva replied calmly, "it is true that you and your colleagues disagree in this matter. But did you not teach us that the Law is decided according to the majority opinion?" [Brachot 37a]

In truth, it is hard to understand Rabban Gamliel's criticism. What did he expect Rabbi Akiva to do? Why was he upset?

Two Methods to Resolve Disputes

In order to resolve legal disputes, there are two methods a scholar may use to decide which opinion should be accepted as law.

The first way is to conduct an extensive analysis of the subject to find out the truth. We examine the issue at hand, weighing the reasoning and supporting proofs for each view, until we can determine which opinion is the most logical.

However, if we are unable to objectively decide which opinion is more substantiated, we fall back on the second method. Instead of the truth, we look for consensus. We follow the majority opinion - not because it is more logical or well-reasoned - but out of the simple need to establish a normative position and avoid disagreement and conflict. If we are seeking consensus and peace, then the most widely held opinion is the preferred one.

Rabban Gamliel was critical of Rabbi Akiva because he thought the young scholar had had the audacity to decide which opinion was the correct one. Therefore he castigated him, "When will you stop butting your head into these legal disagreements?" In other words, where did you get the idea that you could use your head - your own powers of logic and reasoning - to decide issues that are beyond your expertise and knowledge?

Rabbi Akiva responded that he hadn't presumptuously tried to decide which opinion is correct. Rather, he had simply applied the second method of resolving a legal dispute: deciding the issue by consensus, according to the majority opinion.

- [adapted from Ein Ayah vol. II, p. 176]


Shalom,

RRW