Parsha: Lech Lecha, "Leaving Israel"

In  Mishna Torah: Hilchot Melachim: 5:9, the Rambam writes that:


"Even though it was a famine and one is permitted to leave Israel [nevertheless] "einah middat hassidut" ... [It is not the mark of a pious character]
And because of that Machalon and Kilyon - 2 "gedolei hador" [great ones of their generation] ..left and were liable to destruction by "the Maqom".

Questions:
1. If it's Halachically permitted to leave the land of Israel, then who cares about "Middat Hassidut"?

2 If all Jews are on the same level of obligation and liability, then how does being a "Gadol Hador" change someone's level?

3. If even the Rambam concedes that Machalon and Kilyon's leaving Eretz Yisrael was Halachically permitted, then why did he say they were punished? 

4. In Lech L'cha, Avraham Avinu left the Holy Land under similar circumstances - and he seemed to be rewarded and not punished! How does this Rambam address that case?

For further sources

• Torah Temimah on Lech L'cha 12:10 quoting Bava Qama 60b
• Note 13 quoting Bava Batra 91a

Shalom, RRW

Parsha: Noah, "Community and Individual; Ayn Rand and RSR Hirsch"

When is egotism a legitimate expression of moral indignation and when is it just conceit, arrogance and unholy defiance?

Although RSR Hirsch highly praises community elsewhere, I understood how this same community could be evil when reading his observations on Dor Haflagah. Migdal Bavel, though the paradigm of a peaceful co-operative community, set itself up in defiance of the Divine. Foreshadowing both Fascism and Communism, it sought to sacrifice the individual on the altar of the greater whole.

This suppression of the individual rightfully sparks the ego's rebellion  Why rightfully? When it suppresses the individual, any collective without sanction of the Almighty is inherently evil.

No wonder Ayn Rand flew from Godless Bolshevism. Her nature impelled her to rebel. Given the frightening parallels between Migdal Bavel and the Stalinistic 5-Year plans, her flight was well-justified! (Whether her alternative passes muster is another matter.)

R. Hirsch emphasizes that the praiseworthy community and culture is the one built around preserving and perpetuating Torah Tradition. He himself led a paradigmatic community in Frankfort when he broke with the local Heterodox Community there. It remains, although in reduced numbers, in Washington Heights. B"H, it is not the sole community based upon Torah Values.

Any community whose mission is "Hirschian" in nature deserves the deference of the individual. On the other hand, any community designing to compete against G-d deserves the defiance of the repressed individual soul.  The gray area today, dear reader, is the society that is neither culturally devoted to G-d nor out to defeat G-d. This apathy leaves us a conundrum.

Take for example, the United States circa WWII. There was no question of a society and culture which opposed Marxist Atheism in favour of a common non-denominational service to the Al-Mighty and compassion for mankind. This society had the common focus of G-d only in the most general terms, eschewing barriers between sects.

Now that Secularism is replacing this non-denominational common-denominator service to the Creator, this society is slipping off of its pedestal, teetering ever so closely to a Godless tilt, Heaven Forbid. It remains to be seen if we can restore a society that supports a common Deity in a compassionate and mutually supportive fashion as we did over sixty years ago.

Should we veer too far away, individuals will arise and break away to form tiny independent communities re-dedicated to the ideals and traditions that once made us a truly "Great Society". A new Austritt Gemeinder will have to appear to preserve a Torah life-style amid the deterioration of what was once the ideal, just as Avraham ho'Ivri crossed over to oppose the Dor Haflagah in his own day.

Shalom,
RRW

Parsha: B'reishit, "A New Perspective on Etz Hada'at"

In reviewing the Parshah with the Artscroll Ba'al Haturim Humash, I noticed a secondary aspect to Havvah's "sin" of eating from the "Eitz Hada'at".

The original take on Original Sin is that Adam exceeded his authority by telling Havvah not to touch the fruit. His credibility was sunk when the snake so easily debunked his Humra, that Havvah just had to give into temptation. Or did she? The Midrash adds [P. 1395] that Havvah slandered Adam in her mind "All that my teacher [Adam] instructed me is false".

We see that Hashem gave Adam a Mitzvah. Adam -acting as a "Rabbi" - violated "bal Tosif" by over-instructing Havvah. This excessive instruction enabled the Nahash to override the original Mitzvah, too.

What's the slander? After all, Havvah seems correct. She was, after all, misled by her Rabbi. This "slander" is a secondary aspect and highly instructive to any Talmid who finds a flaw in the instructions of his Rebbe. What happens when a Rabbi has apparently said something flawed, or, C"V, something definitely flawed.

How should we react?

Let me re-quote with emphasis: "ALL that my teacher instructed me is false"
This itself is jumping to a false conclusion. Making an error might impeach one's credibility. Furthermore, even while Adam was not infallible, it does not mean that all he said was false. So how should Havvah and/or our hypothetical Talmid should have reacted to a perceived flaw in instruction?

1. A rationalist approach: "While there was a flaw in what my Rebbe said, not all that my teacher instructed me is false" 
2. A believer's approach: "Despite a possible flaw in what my rebbe said, something, (I. E.some core principle) must be true even if he failed on some detail". 

Havvah could have reacted, saying, "wait a minute, Nahash! Just because I can touch this fruit - it doesn't mean I should go ahead and eat it!"

At any rate, this is not about berating Havvah. It's about teaching our hypothetical Talmid not to over-react and to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Yes, Adam erred on the side of caution, but this does not license one to throw caution to the wind.

Many years ago, when I took my driver's test, my instructor told me, "Rich, the speed limit on the course is 25 MPH. But go about 20 anyway".
I proceeded to go 15 MPH. My inspector was impatiently at his wit's end. Although he lectured me about being able to make quicker reactions, he did pass me. My caution, though annoying, was not fatal.
Now, if I had said to myself, "my instructor said 20, but the sign really says 25 - so I'll do better and go 30!" I might still be trying to pass my licensing exam to this day! ;-)

As you see, "fools rush in..." Adam might be faulted for over-compensating, but some level of trust - of emunat hachamim - is a must for Torah Observance

Shalom,
RRW

Parsha: Mishpatim, "Following the Majority Opinion"

Mishpatim: Following the Majority Opinion

A story about Rabbi Akiva, when the famed second century Talmudic sage was a young scholar...

Rabban Gamliel, the head of Sanhedrin, hosted a gathering of scholars in the town of Jericho. The guests were served dates, and Rabban Gamliel honored Rabbi Akiva with reciting the brachah achronah (final blessing). However, Rabban Gamliel and the other sages disagreed about which blessing should be said after eating dates. The young scholar quickly made the blessing - in accordance with the opinion of the other rabbis.

"Akiva!" exclaimed Rabban Gamliel. "When will you stop butting your head into Halachic disagreements?"

"Our master," Rabbi Akiva replied calmly, "it is true that you and your colleagues disagree in this matter. But did you not teach us that the Law is decided according to the majority opinion?" [Brachot 37a]

In truth, it is hard to understand Rabban Gamliel's criticism. What did he expect Rabbi Akiva to do? Why was he upset?

Two Methods to Resolve Disputes

In order to resolve legal disputes, there are two methods a scholar may use to decide which opinion should be accepted as law.

The first way is to conduct an extensive analysis of the subject to find out the truth. We examine the issue at hand, weighing the reasoning and supporting proofs for each view, until we can determine which opinion is the most logical.

However, if we are unable to objectively decide which opinion is more substantiated, we fall back on the second method. Instead of the truth, we look for consensus. We follow the majority opinion - not because it is more logical or well-reasoned - but out of the simple need to establish a normative position and avoid disagreement and conflict. If we are seeking consensus and peace, then the most widely held opinion is the preferred one.

Rabban Gamliel was critical of Rabbi Akiva because he thought the young scholar had had the audacity to decide which opinion was the correct one. Therefore he castigated him, "When will you stop butting your head into these legal disagreements?" In other words, where did you get the idea that you could use your head - your own powers of logic and reasoning - to decide issues that are beyond your expertise and knowledge?

Rabbi Akiva responded that he hadn't presumptuously tried to decide which opinion is correct. Rather, he had simply applied the second method of resolving a legal dispute: deciding the issue by consensus, according to the majority opinion.

- [adapted from Ein Ayah vol. II, p. 176]


Shalom,

RRW

Parsha: Yitro, "Navol Tibbol", Torah as a Co-operative Venture

originally published on 1/12/14

Let's recall Yitro's Mussar to Moshe Rabbenu. Moshe Rabbenu himself couldn't handle the sheer volume of Bnei Yisrael's legal cases without a ranked system of judges beneath him. 

We can easily understand why it's necessary for "G'dolim" to address knotty issues like agunot, defining death, etc. Yet if Moshe Rabbenu  couldn't manage it all,  then al achat kama vakammah, g'dolim today could be overwhelmed too! If it were required that each Rav master every Halachic complexity, then everyone, individually, would face "navol tibbol."  We'd be overwhelmed by the Yam Hatalmud, and Pos'qim, Chas v'Shalom

So it's mistavra that the role of Sarei alafim etc. is just as vital to avoiding "navol tibbol" as Moshe's own role on the top of the pyramid. Local Rabbonim, G'dolim, and any "vaad" or Dayan in between, all play necessary roles in this legal mechanism.Therefore, all levels really need each other. Recall, no one Jew can do all 613 Mitzvot! 

It seems this is the Mussar Heskel from our Parshah: Torah is a co-operative venture


Shalom,
RRW