Saturday, 13 June 2020

Parsha: Shelach, "Meraglim - the Parsha and Haftarah"

"On the other hand, whom did he pick? The successful merageil from last time around - Kaleiv ,  and a known zealot for Hashem - Pinchas.".
- Micha Berger, esteemed moderator of Avodah

True, this is a Midrashic approach.

Here is an alternative from Rabbi Wm. Cohen, the local Orthodox Rabbi when I was growing up. He darshens it thusly:
The meraglim in the parshah were bigshots. They were public figures who went "spying" with a lot of fanfare, and probably packed their egos too! Yehoshua learned this lesson. Regardless of the spies' names, they were sent privately. Their anonymity may have meant that they indeed traveled without their egos.
Beqitzur: This haftara represents both the tiqqun and the lesson learned.

--------------------

The kushiya: why did Moshe send out public figures anyway?

The Hint: What verb(s) describes Moshe's agents?
  • In Shelach?
  • In Huqqat?
  • In Devarim?
Shalom,

RRW

Saturday, 6 June 2020

Parsha: Beha’alotkha, "The Whispering Campaign"


Dvar Torah on Parashath Beha’alotkha
Rabbi Chaim G.Z. Solomon

The Whispering Campaign




Our sedra gives us three very puzzling vignettes, back to back.  Bemidbar chapter 11 begins thusly:  “Vayy’hee ha`am k’mithon’neem, r`a b’oznay Hashem - and the people were like murmurers, evil in the ears of the Lord.  The Lord heard and His anger was kindled.  The fire of the Lord burned amongst them, and devoured (those) at the boundary of the encampment.” (Bemidbar 11:1) Curious, as generally when such devouring fires issue forth, action and consequence occur somewhat near the center of the camp.  Also, when the people complained, how was it that the murmurs were heard by God, but perhaps not by Moshe?  Further, the actual complaint is not recorded.

In a curiously connected report, verses 4 and 5, we have more complaints. “V’hasaphsuph asher b’qirbo, And the ‘mixed multitude’ that was among them had craved cravings; and the children of Israel returned to weeping, saying: Who will provide us flesh to eat! We remember the fish, which we would eat in Egypt for nothing (chinam); the cucumbers, and the melons, and the leeks, and the onions, and the garlic...And Moshe heard the people weeping. The ‘asaphsuph’, frequently rendered ‘mixed multitude’, is a puzzler.  

So to the complaint of the Children of Israel - first, they ask for meat, but then ‘fondly’ remember the fish and vegetables they ate ‘for free’ in Egypt. What does ‘free’ mean here?  The Israelites were slaves, after all!  At the end of the chapter, God’s anger is again kindled against the People, and God strikes those that lusted and meat-eaters, all the People, with a very great plague.  Interestingly, it is only those who lusted whom Scripture records are there buried.

So ends chapter 11.  Chapter 12 picks up straightaway with yet another curious vignette.   Miryam and Aaron speak against Moshe.  First they complain regarding Moshe’s Kushite wife, though the specific issue is not mentioned.  Then, they turn right around and raise a complaint that can really only be taken as criticizing Moshe as arrogant, “Has the Lord indeed only spoken through Moshe?  Has he not also spoken through us?”  God hears (like the first vignette) and God’s anger is kindled against Miryam and Aaron (as in both previous vignettes).   Here though, only Miryam is punished, and even so, only with tsara`at, not death.  Why is only Miryam punished?  And why is the punishment not death?

The trope ‘yichar aph’, rendered, ‘anger was kindled’ when applied to God with respect to the `Am, the People, appears in Shmot 32 (the Golden Calf), Bemidbar 25 (Ba`al Peor), and foretold in Devarim 6, 7, 11 and 29.  In each of these instances idolatry is the relevant transgression.  In our sedra, the anger of the Lord is kindled against the people, but idolatry is not clearly the transgression.  Our sedra appears to be the only outlier in this pattern, though Moshe applies the trope ‘yichar aph’ to God when recounting in Bemidbar 32 the incident of the Spies (Bemidbar 14).  Rambam (Guide for the Perplexed 1.36) would have us categorize all such usages of this trope applied to the People as caused by the sin of idolatry.  How are we to understand Rambam’s required classification?

In the second pericope we’ve studied, the phrase ‘zakharnu, et haddaga, asher nokhal b’mitsrayim, chinam, we remember the fish, which we would eat in Egypt for nothing’ certainly could do for some unpacking.  What is this ‘chinam’, generally rendered ‘for free’, or ‘for nothing’? Sinat Chinam - baseless or causeless hatred, is a phrase with which we are all familiar, unfortunately.  What is the ‘chinam’ of our verse meant to inform?  Yoma 75a would interpret chinam here as free from the obligations of mitswoth, specifically with respect to physical immoralities, for which ‘fish’ must serve as some manner of euphemism.  Sifre Bemidbar 67 is explicit in this regard, that ‘chinam’ in this verse is to be understood as ‘free from the commandments’.   God’s anger is kindled against the people, for an act signifying a desire to shake off the yoke of Torah.  The implication of Rambam’s classification is staggering.

---------------------

Whispering Campaign.
1.(idiomatic) A method of persuasion in which damaging rumors or innuendo are deliberately spread concerning a person or other target, while the source of the rumors tries to avoid detection.

In our third pericope, the exact subject of Miryam’s calumny is almost immaterial.  That Miryam could be criticizing Moshe for separating from his wife, on account of concerns over ritual purity vis a vis a perceived requirement for prophesy, well, that would be a textbook example of lashon harah.  Onqelos’ understanding of the word ‘Kushite’ as ‘beautiful’ is in consonance with Chazal’s interpretation of Miryam’s actions as in sympathy with a neglected wife, as the excuse for this criticism.  On the other hand,the possibility that Miryam is exhibiting color-consciousness would be even worse. What is curious and quite material is that it is clear from the language that Miryam was the primary speaker of the first complaint (vat’daber, not vay’dabru), and that it was God, not Moshe, that ‘heard’ (parallel to the first pericope).


Onomatopoeia
1. An onomatopoeia is a word that imitates or suggests the source of the sound that it describes.

So now, what do we make of the ‘asaphsuph’?  The difficulties with identifying asaphsuph as ‘elders’, ‘strangers’, ‘foreigners’ has been dealt with elsewhere  and need not be repeated here.  We merely must construct an alternative hypothesis.  For that, though, we have really no guidance from Tanakh itself, for this is an example of a hapax legomenon, a word that appears in Tanakh only this once, so no contextual hints as to its meaning may be drawn from other instances.  The word itself is perhaps a quadriliteral, with a root samekh-peh-samekh-peh. ‘Saph-saph’.  Even if not, it is still very similar to such words as gimgum (גמגום) stuttering tzichtzooach (צחצוח) polishing tiphtooph (טפטוף) dripping shifshoof (שיפשוף) rubbing, and of course baqbooq (בקבוק) a bottle (what is the sound of liquid pouring from a bottle?)

We’ve a word in English

Susurration
1. The sound of whispering

Perhaps the very word used to label these pestiferous miscreants itself is an onomatopoeia?

The pattern begins to come together.  These three vignettes, though not a re-telling of the same story, use several similar devices to tie them together.  In the first pericope, no one really spoke out loud, and the complaint itself was so immaterial it wasn’t even recorded.  It was those who were not central to the camp, those on the ‘outskirts’ bore the brunt of God’s kindled anger.  These, perhaps, were the people on the edge, whispering.  Whatever they were whispering, it was evil enough to warrant death.  In the second, the asaphsuph, the whisperers, goaded the People into their weeping.  The People’s complaints themselves seem logically unconnected, as if the first was merely a pretext for the second.  In their complaint, however, they rebel against God, throwing off the yoke of Torah in a baseless act of disloyalty.  God’s anger is kindled, yet the worse punishment seems to be attached to the whisperers.  In the third and final pericope, Miryam goads Aaron with a primary complaint that seems unspecific as to its nature (parallel to the first vignette) and unconnected to the secondary (parallel to the second vignette).  The secondary complaint does itself smack of an act of disloyalty against Moshe, the most humble of men, though it is God who seems to take it personally.  And who is punished? It is Miryam, the whisperer, the instigator.

So now what is left to us is to understand the severity of God’s response in the first two pericopes.  The third is easily understood as a lesson against one of several possible variations of lashon hara; Chazal and later commentators all seem quite comfortable with tsara’at as the appropriate punishment.   Miryam as the whispering instigator gives us a key to understanding the first two.  (Perhaps as a tool to strengthen the connection between the second and third pericopes Scripture uses as a play on words the root asph, gather, to describe how Miryam is to return to the camp after her seven day exile, instead of several more natural words, e.g. ‘return’, ‘enter’,  ‘come in’.)  Rambam would have us interpret these first two pericopes as instances of idolatry.   How so?  Our other clue is the Report of the Spies.  A principle message of the spies was that of God’s implied inability to see the People of Israel successfully through the settlement of Canaan.  Indeed, echoes of ‘Who can provide us meat’ are heard.  The message is clear.  Denying the omnipotence of God, ‘shorting his hand’ and through that pretext seeking to divest oneself of the yoke of Torah is no other sin than that of idolatry.  Underhanded disloyalty towards Moshe is bad enough to warrant tsara`at. Whispering others into disloyalty towards God will surely bring the severest consequences as the instigation of idolatry.

There is no middle ground between the genuine faith of Caleb and Yehoshua and the rebellious idolatry of the spies, whisperers and goaders.  Ours is to choose the path of genuine faith and loyalty to Torah. Bivrakhah,

- Rabbi Chaim G.Z. Solomon, Ph.D.


Note: Rabbi Solomon is a former student of mine, and is Rabbi in Mt. Dora, Florida

 
Shalom,

RRW

Saturday, 30 May 2020

P. Nasso, The Nazir - Living in Moderation

The Nazir: Live in Moderation - Judaism - Israel National News
R Eliyahu Safran:
"Perishut is an attitude to live by, not necessarily a way of life to live with. It is a personal, not a universal, goal. So too Nezirut is a personal and temporary goal, to be used when necessary. It is not a rule to be imposed upon the community. It is not Torah."
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/10295

Shalom,
RRW

Saturday, 23 May 2020

Naaseh v'Nishma 2 - The D'var Torah

 originally published 1/14/14

The age-old question or issue grappled with by the Midrash is:
"Why did the Israelites precede Nishma with Naaseh"? IOW how could any Naaseh take place without a preceding Nishma to know WHAT to do first? Seems obvious!

There are several beautiful nuggets in Rabbinical Literature on this. This D'var Torah as I recall was originally based upon a Malbim. But in subsequent years, I could not locate it there. So, suffice it to say I didn't make it up but I've forgotten the precise source. Anyone who CAN identify the source is most welcome to fill the gap.

What's the p'shat of a NISHMA that follows a Naaseh? It seems obvious that in order to facilitate any Naaseh, SOME "how- to" handbook is a given - whether oral, mimetic, or even on video, Naaseh presumes a pre-existing prescription. As such, Halachah l'maaseh is a predicate for Naaseh, and therefore Kal vochomer must precede any Nishma.
So the sequence is
Mitzva
Performance [Naaseh]
THEN
Nishma!
So what is the definition of that term Nishma?

Nishma simply may be defined as Torah Lishmah. In fact, it is Torah WITHOUT any pragmatic ramification!
So when we learn Shulchan Aruch in order to Observe Shabbat, that is NOT a function of Naaseh, it is a preparation, a "hechsher mitzvah" for Naaseh.
Nishma goes beyond Observance. It is deeper. It is unique to Israel to go beyond the Divine Command.
As such, there are many implications to this. Most reserved for an upcoming post
The simplest and most straightforward Implication is that Men AND women have an equal obligation in [most of] Naaseh. Thus any "Torah" that teaches practical Halachah is equally required for both genders
However, Nishma is purely a Masculine Obligation of "Torah Lishma"
-----------------

To briefly expand the question of whether this theoretical Torah lishma is merely Optional to or Off-limits to women is the subject of debate.
At any rate, this is the essence of the d'var Torah - that Torah studied BEYOND that which is a prerequisite for Performance THAT is Nishma.
BEH in upcoming posts I will
•.Expound on some of the other ramifications
• Offer some alternative understandings of "NISHMA"

Shalom
RRW

Saturday, 9 May 2020

Saturday, 2 May 2020

Parshat Emor - Ayin Tachat Ayin, etc.

originally posted May 7, 2015

ויקרא פרק כד

יז ואיש, כי יכה כל-נפש אדם--מות, יומת.  יח ומכה נפש-בהמה, ישלמנה--נפש, תחת נפש. 
יט ואיש, כי-יתן מום בעמיתו--כאשר עשה, כן יעשה לו. 
כ שבר, תחת שבר, עין תחת עין, שן תחת שן--כאשר יתן מום באדם, כן ינתן בו. 
כא ומכה בהמה, ישלמנה; ומכה אדם, יומת



Given:
ומכה נפש-בהמה, ישלמנה--
נפש, תחת נפש.

It seems obvious in context that when someone destroys another's OX that beit din does not destroy his OX!! Rather the damager pays comcpnesation.

And so too, it would seem from context - davar hallameid mai'inyono - that the rest of ayin tachat ayin addresses compensation, too!

And that the lone exception is explicit, namely murdering a fellow human, where execution is specified.

Kol Tuv,
RRW

Saturday, 25 April 2020

P. Acharei-Mot, K'doshim - A Novel perspective on Arayyot

originally posted April 25, 2015

The Traditional perspective in the various Arayyot taboos are that they are a function of indivdual Q'dushah. In other words, these laws promote Holiness in the INDIVIDUAL person by a demanding code of highly moral behaviour, etc.

The Preamble in Acharei-Mot discusses avoiding Egyptian and Canaanite Behaviour. I suggest that the Torah is suggesting that we as a Torah society not emulate those societies. The clincher? V'nichr'tu Han'fashot ha'osot.

Shloymie: Let's say you're correct - Just how does this societal taboo work?

RRW: Let's assume that humans have a libido. And that this tempts humans to "objectify" targets in a predatory manner.

Left unchanneled, a man's Mother, Sister Daughter, might be subjected to predatory behaviour. Even boys and animals could become objectified via Mishkav Zachar or Bestiality.

This society creates a sense where a child has no safety at home. Nor could a child bathe or shower safely with members of the same gender. It is a society of predatory objectification.

Taboos to the Rescue

By imposing deep-seated taboos, the children are given a safety net. Girls need not fear their brothers or even fathers. Children may feel safe in same-gender showers or wash-rooms.

Take away this safety-net, and Egyptian-style objectification may run amok. Sisters grow up to be their brothers's spouses. They grow up as targets from an accepting society.

To my way of thinking, these taboos are targeted at creating a society of reduced objectification.

L'havdil it's analogous to Burkas in Moslem cultures

We take taboos against incest for granted because Xtian Societies have already adopted much of this from Leviticus.. Before mattan Torah, no one could take it for granted.

Shalom,
RRW

Parsha: Kedoshim, "Kedusha - Beyond the Spiritual"

We chose an article from Nishma's Online Library archives  that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah and to initiate some discussion.

This week's parsha is Kedoshim. The topic is kedusha. We invite you to look at a
Spark of the Week 5756-15: Kedusha: Beyond the Spiritual on this topic. 


Shalom,

RBH

Re: [Avodah] Acharei Mot "What Happens After Develops From What Happened Before"

originally posted April 25, 2015

On Mon, Apr 14, 2008 at 7:38 PM, Cantor Wolberg <cantorwolberg@cox.net> wrote:

Acharei Mot is the only Torah portion with the word "death" in its title.  As we know, death in Judaism is associated with tamei.
However, as everything must be taken in context, so too, should death.  The portion "Acharei Mot" is followed by "Kedoshim".

So the context is much more optimistic than at first appearance. "Acharei Mot"  "AFTER death", is "Kedoshim", holiness.

Death is not the finality; holiness is.

ri


Also the cute quip
Acharei mot
Kedoshim emor

After one dies call them holy [iow don't hold any grudge after death]


--
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
see: http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/

Saturday, 18 April 2020

Tazria/Metzorah: Childbirth and Circumcisions

To many, the insertion of the mitzvah of mila, circumcision, in the presentation of the laws of the yodedet, the woman who gave birth, may just seem to be a narrative coincidence. Once the Torah was taking about the birth of a boy, it also mentioned mila. The commentators, however, find it bewildering. What does one have to do with the other?

Rabbi Hecht addresses this issue in an Insight from 5756 available at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5756-14.html

P. Tazria - "Uvayom Hashmini"

Short version:

Questions
1. How is it that a woman giving birth to a Zachar makes her Tum'ah for only seven days while birthing a N'qievah lasts a fortnight?
2. What is uvayom hashmini yimol b'sar orlato doing here?

Answer:
The Brith Millah on the 8th day shortens the woman's condition either due to:
A. The Torah gave her dispensation to attend the Brit
B. The healing power of the mal'ach habbrit mitigates the damage she suffers, thereby "commuting her sentence to time served."

Shalom,
RRW

Thursday, 16 April 2020

Parsha: Shemini, "Punishment or Consequences?"

Let's start with Acharei Mot. What does "v'lo yamut" imply?

Coming into the proximity of the Qodshei Qodshim requires protection . For Aharon, that meant a proper Q'toret. An improper Qktoret - even b'shogeig - could have left the Kohen Gadol without his "radiation suit." He would risk death through exposure to an overwhelming dose of Q'dusha, not through his transgressions. Like an electrician with a  faulty rubber glove, the shock would be overwhelming.

Back to Nadav and Avihu. Fire consumed them mainly because their ersatz Q'toret failed to protect them. Therefore Aharon was commanded how to avoid such a similar catastrophe.

And as for Uzah - in the Haftara of Sh'mini - he wasn't punished. He lacked protection from the aron's overwhelming  Q'dusha.

Electricity, radiation and high places all entail physical risk. It's like a child sticking his finger in an exposed socket. Hashem is not punishing the kid. We are fixated on the concept of seeing din as punishment. Din isn't "punishment," but natural consequences.

Shalom,
RRW

Parsha: Shemini, "Asher Lo Tsivah"

Pick your preferred parshanut.  

Parshanut suggests three translations of the phrase, "Asher Lo Tzivah" (Vayikra: 10:1) There is basically a 2-way split concerning Nadav and Avihu (N&A) and their eish zara. The first two schools may help start a future Nishmablog poll, BE"H, though the third school is kinda' tangential.

  1. "They were commanded NOT"  N&A were actually seeking to grow spiritually through transgressing the commandment NOT to bring such an eish zarah [Tur et. Al.] It literally went up in flames  Don't serve Hashem by violating protocol
  2.  "They were NOT commanded" - N&A added on an extra embellishments. They acted excessively "frum"  and their zeal was their sin in their spiritual approach. This idea is very popular among Left-wing circles. Don't be mosif "humrot". [Bal tosif. Al t'hee tzaddiq harbei
  3. This explanation can work for either side of the split. Since N&A brought ersatz K'toret, they were left unprotected to eish Hashem and vulnerable to a form of spiritual "radiation."  Their action was not so much a sin as a failure to use real Ketoret. It was what they failed to do which allowed them to get burnt. [See Haforah of Uzah]. Genuine Ketoret was tantamount to a radiation suit; don't play with the rules lest you risk exposure.

Let me tell a related story.  

There once lived a woman looking to add a spiritual dimension to her avodah. A Great Gadol, "Moshe," asked her to experiment by wearing a four-cornered garment without tzitzit. She felt exhilirated. 

Moshe exclaimed, "For three months, you have been wearing a garment without any religious or halachic value, it is thus clear that your feeling comes from a source outside of the Mitzvah", and he [Moshe] did not grant her permission to wear a Talit " [Source?]


To which Avodah's R Micha Berger protested:

We do many things that come from sources outside the mitzvah. "Hinei Keil yeshuasi" before Havdalah, for example. The particular patterns of hand washing most qehillos use for neigl vasr or before hamotziQabbalas Shabbos. Etc, etc, etc... Why is this woman wanting to do something that makes her feel connected to the Borei valueless just because it is non-halachic? Would this Gadol "Moshe" have given the same advice to NCSY and tell them to stop doing kumzitzin or a pre-havdalah "ebbing" for an hour? [Source??]

This offers us a segue towards a poll on valid paths to spirituality in Judaism. Which guidelines are permitted or desirable?

Shalom
RRW

P. Shmini - Asher Lo Tsivah 2 - Truth or Consequences

Originally published 3/31/11, 6:54 pm.
Previously, I had written:
3. [Can work either way] N&A were left vulnerable to a form of spiritual "radiation" because their Q'toret with eish zarah was ersatz instead of genuine, leaving them unprotected against "eish Hashem". Not sin so much as a failure to use a bona fide Q'toret allowed them to get burnt. [See Hafatarah of Uzah]. A genuine q'toret was tantamount to a radiation suit. Don't play with the rules lest you risk exposure.
Background:
When I was teaching the Parshah at Cong. MT. Sinai in Wash Heights, circa late 1990's, I made a conscious approach to shift away from the idea of punishment and vindictiveness and towards "spiritual consequences" in order to portray that "Elohim-Teva-Middat Haddin" is a function of the natural order and that Elohim is not out to get anyone. I was mostly inspired by Sefer Hachinuch's compassionate approach to Torah, and BE"H I've since discovered a similar Hashqafah in Tomer D'vorah, as well as, to an extent, in other s'farim.
When a child such as myself who once did this - but please do NOT try it at home - sticks his hand into an electric outlet one will receive a shock but not due to a malicious, vindictive G-d.
Similarly,  Nadav & Avihu and Uzzah died - according to my parshanut - because they got overwhelmingly exposed to a kind of radiation. This same radiation of shechinah, for instance, could blind those peeking at birkas kohanim in the. Mikdash. Or could kill the Kohein Gadol on YK if or when his Q'toret or Avodah were somehow flawed. The cloud of a valid Q'tores acts as a Divine shield protecting the Kohein Gadol. Nadav & Avihu lacked that.
Uzzah could never touch the Aron Hakodesh with his bare hands and live. I darshen away any "anger" on behalf of Hashem and see it as merely as manifestation of a typical human perception of Divine Anger
L'mashal: my daughter once banged herself as a toddler against the table. The baby-sitter yelled, "bad table" a very human reaction. But the table was static. So was the "radiation" from the Aron in Uzzah's case or the Shechinah in the case of Nadav &Avihu. Their impulsivity got them in trouble by going to an unsafe precinct without proper protection.
Similarly, when one cheats with weights and measures Hashem ALLOWS Amaleiq C"V to harm us. He does not necessarily send them. Yes this is similar to l'havdil Jerry Falwell's "drashah" regarding 9/11, the removal of a Divine Shield. His reason for HOW/WHY that shield was removed is quite debatable, but I had already bought into that approach myself long before 9/11.

An Adam Harishon who defies Hashem by eating the forbidden fruit may not remain in Gan Eden.
A Bnai Yisroel dor hamidbar that weeps over the spies cannot enter Israel.
A King Shaul who saves Agag may not rule. Even though, as per Midrash, Shaul was no sinner, he suffered for his flaw as did all of the above suffer the consequences of their character flaws.
Thus the onesh in the Torah is, to me, Consequences, as in Truth or consequences.
And yes - Once in a while a neis intervenes, for example, in the case of Yosef in the pit, etc.
I hope this helps.

Shalom,
RRW

Parsha: Shemini, "Olam Chesed Yiboneh"


Another D'var Torah from Cantor Wolberg--
Shalom,
RRW

---------------------------------------
There's a verse in Parshat Shemini (Lev. 11:13) which states: "These shall you abominate from among the birds, they may not be eaten; they are an abomination..." In other words, fowl that are cruel are not eligible to be kosher. One will not always find cruel fowl necessarily exercising cruelty (we see this in the human species as well). It would therefore have been impractical and impossible to have positively identified a specific bird as being unfit. Therefore, the Torah must list all the fowl that are unsuitable for eating.

There is an overriding concept in the laws of kashruth that the characteristics of what we eat somehow have a great influence on the way we behave. The old saying: "You are what you eat." We do not want to associate ourselves for instance with cruelty, therefore we are forbidden to eat cruel animals, and in this case, some species of fowl. Among the fowl that are listed as being non kosher is the chasidah, the white stork. You may ask what cruel character trait does the stork possess. Rashi mentions that the reason it is called a "chasidah" is because it does chesed only with its friends regarding the food it finds. On the surface this seems strange. If the stork acts kindly with its food, why is it disqualified as being kosher?

A beautiful explanation to this difficulty has been given by the Chidushei Harim, in which he explains the nature of the stork. He says that the fact the stork only shows its kindness with its friends defines its cruelty. A fowl who is not in the circle of the stork's good buddies is excluded from getting any help from the stork in finding food. In other words, the stork is very selective in its kindness. This type of kindness is misleading. We, as Jews, are commanded even to help our foes. If we come across someone we dislike intensely who needs help, we are commanded to help. The stork, on the other hand, helps only his inner circle of friends. It is this character trait of differentiating between close friends and others when it comes to providing food that makes the stork non-kosher.

Chesed means reaching out altruistically, with love and generosity to all. The process of maturing involves developing our sense of caring for others. This is crucial for spiritual health. The Talmud likens someone who doesn't give to others as the "walking dead." A non-giving soul is malnourished and withered. It is only through unconditional love that our successful future will be built. In the words of King David (Psalm 89:3): Olam chesed yiboneh - "the world is built on kindness." The more this kindness dissipates and degenerates, the more danger of the foundation collapsing.

- Cantor Wolberg

Sunday, 5 April 2020

Parsha: BeShalah, "Mah Titz'aq Eilai?"

originally posted January 16, 2016

See Shmot: Beshalah: 14:15


Rashi cites a Midrash explaining why Hashem tells Moshe to stop praying. He offers two reasons. 

A No time to lengthen prayer if people are suffering
B. Hashem is asking, "why Bother ME? It's in Your hands!"


This reminds me of a wise statement about Prayer and Action:
PRAY as if everything depends upon G-d,
ACT as if everything depends upon you!

Shalom, RRW

Sunday, 29 March 2020

Tzav: The Challenge of Unity

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library , we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Tzav.

We invite you to look at an article on this topic here.
http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5760-36.htmhttp://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5760-36.htm

Monday, 23 March 2020

Parshah: Vayikra, "Leviticus, Sacrifices, and Dialectic"

Perhaps one of the more controversial aspects of the Torah is the karbanot - the sacrificial cult. Rambam champions a rationalistic approach very in vogue with most moderns. On the other hand, Ramban has a multi-level approach that includes a massive dose of spiritual symbolism very popular with Mystics.

Rav Shimshon Rephael Hirsch embraced this symbolic approach in his own commentary and modernized it according to the sensibilities of the 19th Century. The Ritva defends Rambam from attacks by Ramban. This is most fascinating because Ritva was the key student of Ramban's most famous student. He goes on to show that Rambam was not as "anti-sacrifice" as he appears to be at first glance.

Thus the dialectic is thus:
  • Thesis: Torah/Ramban pro-sacrifice
  • Antithesis: Prophets/Rambam questioning the sacrificial cult
  • Synthesis: Ritva answering Rambam's attacks.
This fascinating overview is culled from the opening article by the late, great, Nechama Leibowitz OBM On Vayikra. I highly recommend this give and take as she cites original sources. Note: This Ritva is in the further study section.

Shalom, RRW