Parshah: Vayikra, "Leviticus, Sacrifices, and Dialectic"

Perhaps one of the more controversial aspects of the Torah is the karbanot - the sacrificial cult. Rambam champions a rationalistic approach very in vogue with most moderns. On the other hand, Ramban has a multi-level approach that includes a massive dose of spiritual symbolism very popular with Mystics.

Rav Shimshon Rephael Hirsch embraced this symbolic approach in his own commentary and modernized it according to the sensibilities of the 19th Century. The Ritva defends Rambam from attacks by Ramban. This is most fascinating because Ritva was the key student of Ramban's most famous student. He goes on to show that Rambam was not as "anti-sacrifice" as he appears to be at first glance.

Thus the dialectic is thus:

• Thesis: Torah/Ramban pro-sacrifice
• Antithesis: Prophets/Rambam questioning the sacrificial cult
• Synthesis: Ritva answering Rambam's attacks.

This fascinating overview is culled from the opening article by the late, great, Nechama Leibowitz OBM On Vayikra. I highly recommend this give and take as she cites original sources. Note: This Ritva is in the further study section.

Shalom, RRW

P. Vayiqra - The Torah on Infallibility

In Hamishi of Vayiqra we see three cases of sin/error:

A. A Kohein Gadol who sins/errs.
B. The entire congregation -or as per Hazal the Sanhedrin - but perhaps BOTH understandings apply.
C. A Nassi.

In Sh'mini, Moshe apparently renders an incorrect hora'h and is corrected by his brother Aharon.
Who - I.E. what individual - in Judaism is infallible?

Shalom,
RRW

Parsha: Vayikra, "Catholic Israel"

"When the entire congregation errs..." (Leviticus 4:13), Hazal equates the following :

• "The entire congregation errs" ==> The Sanhedrin errs.

Now, In the absence of any Sanhedrin it makes sense to go back to the original text. It now follows  to imply the converse:

• The Sanhedrin ==> The entire Congregation of Israel.

---------------------
Illustration:
The United States' of America's Congress, or the Canadian Parliament represent all of the the people. In the absence of such a representative body, then all of the people represent themselves.

Shalom,
RRW

Vayikra: Progression and Regression

Originally published 3/14/08, 12:23 PM, Eastern Daylight Time.

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library , we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Vayikra. The topic is the movement of ethics, specifically are we becoming more or less ethical? Rambam contends that sacrifices were an allowance to past weaknesses in the human being and it is better to worship God without animal sacrifices. Ramban strongly disagrees. If sacrifices were ordained at Sinai, they are part of the perfect Torah. Is there any possible reconciliation for these divergent opinions

We invite you to look at an article on this topic here.
http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5754-19.htm

P. Vayiqra - Two Mussar Maxims from Torah T'mimah

Here are two tweets giving us Mussar on the parshah from the Torah Temimah.

"@NishmaTweet: P. Vayiqra 1:1 Mussar 1 TT [1] don't enter pi'tom. Announce yourself first. Good etiquette, good psychology."

"@NishmaTweet: P. Vayiqra 1:1 Mussar 2 TT [2] don't talk or address someone w/o getting their approval first also Good etiquette & good psychology."

Thus, we see some Midrash Halachah offering us practical ethical behaviour:
Don't startle people by entering abruptly.
Don't talk or preach to people w/o asking their permission first.
Be considerate - and use wisdom when doing so.

Shavua Tov,
Shalom,
RRW

P. Vayiqra - Lirtzono, Kofin Oto ad she'omer "Rotzeh Ani"

Originally published 3/11/11, 2:10 pm.

See Vayiqra 1:3
Rashi D"H "Yaqriv Oto"
Torah T'mimah #25,26
Quoting -
• Arachin 21a
• Qiddushin 50a
• Rambam MT Hil. Geirushin 2:20

People wonder where the Rambam got the notion of coercing a Get - when Halachah requires that a Get must be given of one's one free will.
One can follow the bouncing ball from Qorbanot that shows that we can coerce an offering which must also be of one's own free will.

The Rambam provides a caveat. One must be an otherwise Observant Jew who resists doing the proper thing. This would not work with a complete rebel or - as the Rambam himself notes - that Judaism does not require this act.
Interestingly, the Moznayim Touger edition cites neither of the 2 Talmudic passages above

Shalom,
RRW

P. Vayiqra - Shemen for M'nachot and the Mystery of the Pach Shemen

Originally published 3/11/11, 10:22 am.

See Vayiqra 2:1 and Rashi

Rashi asks -
Q: Why is "Shemen" said twice?
A: Because the 2nd & 3rd drops are kosher for m'nachot unlike the shemen for the m'norah which may come only from the first drop.

Now using this we can understand and answer the Question -
Why would the Kohein Gadol seal a "pach shemen"?
A. Because he needed to set aside M'norah oil away from M'nachot oil.
Mystery solved!  Unless the 2 oils appear differently to the naked eye.

Shalom,
RRW

P. Vayiqra - "Qorbon"

Originally published 3/10/11, 8:58 pm.

Here is some trivia to contemplate...

In which Books of Tanach can the term "Qorbon" [in its many forms] be found; as opposed to using terms like Zevach, etc.?

Credit for this insight goes to R Sacha Pecaric who has translated the Humash into Polish wherein he discussed this curious phenomenon.
Zhinkuyen Pan Rabbin Sacha.

Hint: consult a good robust Concordance. See if a pattern emerges

Shalom,
RRW

The Arba Parshiot

Originally published 3/4/11, 11:19 am. 

As we conclude the Arba Parshiot this week with, of course, Parshat HaChodesh, we invite you to take a look at
Insight 5756-12: From Purim to Pesach
at
http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/spark5756-12.html 

Pekudei: The Cloud

Originally published 2/28/09, 5:50 PM, Eastern Daylight Time.

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Pekudei and our topic is the cloud over the Ohel Mo'ed. It is really not so simple to assume that it symbolizes God's Presence.

We invite you to further look at this issue at
http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5769-22.htm

Vayakhel: The Motivation for Giving

Originally published 2/28/09, 5:50 PM, Eastern Daylight Time.

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Vayakhel. The topic is tzedakah, specifically how we decide to distribute our funds for worthwhile causes. There are always more needs than available funds, so how do we determine priorities? Where would you put the call to give toward the Mishkan in a world of competing needs?

We invite you to look at an article on this genaral topic at
http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5757-10.html

Parsha: Ki Tisa, "Aaron's Honour"

We need not be overly judgmental re: Aharon's role in the Eigel Masecha when we read the following:

What's with the sarcasm against Aharon? Yes, the making of the gold into the form of a calf was, as per Rashi to 32:4, not Aharon's doing (it was done by Egyptian magicians or by Micha, as the case may be). So according to this, he could indeed correctly say: "All I did was throw the gold into the fire, and as far as I was concerned it would have just melted there into a big blob; others are to blame for the actual making of the calf.
Same thing with "hisparaku." True that Aharon tells the people "paraku," but in a transitive rather than a reflexive sense: "take off the golden rings from your wives', sons', and daughters' ears..." - but not from your own. Whereas the next verse continues that they instead brought him their own jewelry: "vayisparaku" - a reflexive form - "all of the people took off the gold rings in their ears..." (Rashi makes this point explicitly in his commentary to 32:2.) So Aharon's description in 32:24 is indeed in keeping with this. "I asked only 'lemi zahav' - go see who in your families has gold available; but 'hisparaku,' they took off their own earrings, which I had not expected."
In short, then, Aharon is giving a quite accurate summary of what happened, distinguishing between what he did (asking for people to bring their families' gold, throwing it in the fire) and what he did not do (having them bring their own gold, making the calf). He's not trying to mislead Moshe. If anything, he leaves out other considerations in his own favor, such as his fear for his life after seeing Chur murdered for opposing them (Rashi to 32:5).

Kol tuv,
- Alex Heppenheimer
- aheppenh@yahoo.com
-Mahpach list
- Reproduced with the permission of Alex Heppenheimer

When in doubt - give our "icons" a break.

Shalom, RRW

P. Ki Tissa - Rashi on Ki Shicheit Amcha

A liberal friend of mine would like to advance a correspondingly liberal conversion policy that is contrary to GPS and other more restrictive policies.

What does Rashi say about such kind-heartedness?

Ki Tisa 22:7 D"H "Ki. Shicheit Amcha"

Hashem talking to Moshe -
"You went ahead and converted them w/o consulting ME and said 'good that the converts should embrace the Sh'china' those are the ones who caused this corruption"

I'm sure that nevertheless Hashem does embrace Geirim. However, the context here is that Moshe accepted a mass of Geirim who were motivated by the Wonders of the Exodus and not by a solid yearning to embrace Hashem and the Jewish People - in stark contrast to Ruth! This "Erev Rav" was composed of "front-runners", not sincere proselytes

The Road to 'H..L' is paved with Good Intentions. Moshe's Chessed lacked the necessary restriction, and his liberalism introduced a corrupting influence, that would eventually serve as an internal fifth column

The history of the events here is not essential. What is essential is Hazal's attitude of warning us of the danger of being inclusive w/o weighing the potential negative consequences

Of course HOW restrictive we should be is a matter for discussion. It is only natural to react to a failed policy in either direction, namely either too exclusive or too inclusive


Shalom
RRW

H. Ki Tissa - Eliyahu's Ultimatum

Note: Since Haftarat Pinchas discusses Eliyahu, I took the liberty to refer to another Haftarah starring Eliyahu Hanavi.

Eliyahu:
If Hashem is your G-d then worship HIM
If Bal is your god worship IT

RRW's corollary:
If Torah is your Guide then follow THAT
If the New York Times* is your guide then follow THAT.
---
* or Political Correctness

--------------------
BE"H I will try to show how modernity may fit in

Shalom,
RRW

Parsha Ki Tissa: Moses’ Horns is Not a Mistranslation

«Most commentators have simply said that Jerome mistranslated "keren" as "horned" rather than  "radiant."  But Bena Elisha Medjuck, a McGill University Department of Jewish Studies graduate student, offered a more complex explanation in his 1988 thesis "Exodus 34:29-35: Moses' 'Horns' in Early Bible Translation and Interpretation."[1]  Medjuck explains that Jerome was well-acquainted both with the variant meanings of "keren" and with the prevailing translation of his contemporary Jewish scholars – with whom he consulted!   Jerome chose the "horned" translation as metaphor faithful to the text: a depiction of Moses' strength and authority, and a glorification of the Lord!  Jerome even explained this in his accompanying commentary!  

Horns were almost universally viewed by ancient civilizations as symbols of power, not as the negative or demonic symbols they became for Christians thousands of years later.  For example, both Alexander the Great and Attila the Hun were described as wearing horns.  Mellinkoff reminds us that horned helmets were often worn by priests and kings, with the horns connoting that divine power and authority had been bestowed upon them.  


Moreover, in his book Did Moses Really Have Horns? (URJ Press, 2009) Rabbi Dr. Rifat Sonsino reminds us that the Hebrew Bible contains many other references to "horns" as symbols of power and authority....»

Ki Tissa: Moses' Horns: Not a Mistranslation > Rabbi Dr. Art Levine
http://rabbiartlevine.com/Home/tabid/2652/ID/840/Ki-Tissa-Moses-Horns-Not-a-Mistranslation.aspx


Kol Tuv,
RRW

Parsha: Ki Tisa, "Life is Complex"

It's in the Nishma tagline: Life is complex, Torah is complex etc.

Rabbi Hecht and I share a synchronicity on complexity. 

 People are seeking the old black-and-white solutions that made magic popular 1,000 years ago and dictators popular about 70 years ago. We seem to be drifting towards a new Dark Ages. Perhaps this is why Roshei Yeshiva are now being invested with "rebbe"-like infallibility -an absolute anathema to misnagidic thinking!

Anyhow - in the parsha -  we see that all 600,000+ adult Israelites were labelled with the guilt for the "Molten Calf" except for the Levi'im, Yehoshua,  women and children. Yet the Levite-produced carnage amounted to a mere 3,000 souls. This was less than 1/60 the of the total. Therefore, rabbinic thinking should deem it a nullified trivial measure!

Hazal have explained that there was not just one level of guilt, but at least 3 levels:

1. Those who sinned with witnesses and warning
2. Those who sinned with witnesses and NO warning
3. Those who sinned without witnesses

There is also another hierarchy:
The Eirev Rav instigated the sin and were the ones who first started sinning. Some Israelites joined along, while some just watched without any Pinchas-like protest. Therefore, while only 3,000 Israelites were guilty of the actual sin of serving idols, the collective guilt of acquiescence or of condoning was nationwide.

This leads us to consider that not every guilt or culpability is morally equivalent. To say that since Andy Pettite was not 100% forthcoming at first makes him as big a liar as the Rocket or as McNamee is mis-leading and ingenuous. There are degrees of guilt. Fault is not a black and white continuum. There are also levels of honesty. While few humans bat 1.000 in the honesty department, not all are compulsive liars either!

That said: culpability is a funny thing! Many "public Jews" have railed that the world was silent about the Holocaust whilst it transpired, yet many - myself included - are silent as a slaughter occurs in Darfur.

A Hong Kong native who owns a Chinese restaurant lamented to me: Jews had a Holocaust . What about the Chinese!? Indeed, he is correct. In the aftermath of the Jimmy Doolittle raid "40 seconds over Tokyo" Japanese soldiers exacted revenge on 250,000 Chinese over the next few weeks. Nanking was raped!

Who in the West cares to comment!? In fact, most North Americans buy the Euro-Centric version of WWII. They begin at Hitler's invasion of Poland, almost completely ignoring Japan's occupation of China, not to mention Manchuria, etc.

Even in Europe, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the Spanish Civil War were surely part of the WWII cluster of the battles of the dictators! The point is, while standing silently by is not the same level of culpability as committing the dirty deed, nevertheless culpability there is indeed! Woe to all of us for not doing our best to protest

Shalom,
RRW

Parshat Zachor: Choice in Destruction

Originally published 3/18/11, 9:58 am.
This article originally appeared in Nishma Update, March 1992 and is also available on the Nishma website.

Choice in Destruction

In Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzva Asseh 187, Rambam, when describing the command to destroy the Seven Nations that inhabited Canaan, uses the verb le'harog, to kill. The Chinuch, Mitzva 425, is similar. Yet both authors in describing the mitzva to destroy Amalek apply a different language. The command is to destroy the zerah, the progeny of Amalek and, what seems to be even of greater significance, to eradicate any memory of Amalek from this world. In Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 5:5, in codifying this law, Maimonides only mentions this latter part although in the Sefer HaMitzvot he mentions the first. What significance is there to this change in language? What is the actual essence of the mitzva? 

To answer these questions, at least according to the view of Rambam, it is necessary to look at a most controversial law that Maimonides codifies in Hilchot Melachim 6:1-4. According to Rambam, the Jewish nation's obligation to make peace before going to war applies even to battles with the Seven Nations and Amalek. How does this reconcile with the mitzvot regarding the destruction of these nations? The language of the Kesef Mishna is most revealing. While Ra'avad and others state that this agreement of peace must include the observance of the Seven Noachide Laws on the part of these nations, the Kesef Mishna presents a most interesting reason why - " for if they accept the Seven Noachide Laws they leave the category of the Seven Nations and Amalek and they are like bnei Noach ha'kesharim, righteous non-Jews". In terms of the Seven Nations, the mitzva is now fully understandable. The command is to kill the members of these nations, as Rambam states in Sefer HaMitzvot, they are the root of idolatry. Once someone accepts, however, the Noachide Code, they are no longer a member of these nations that are the root of idolatry and therefore there is no command to kill this individual ( in fact this would be prohibited just as it is prohibited to kill any non-Jew ). How, though, does one understand the mitzva regarding Amalek? 

On the surface the answer seems to be simple - the command regarding Amalek should be similar. The language in the Mishneh Torah and Sefer HaMitzvot however must lead to a different conclusion. Regarding the Seven Nations, the command is to kill them. If, however, the Seven Nations do not exist, because of something such as acceptance of the Noachide Code, then this mitzva cannot be performed. Encouraging the members of the Seven Nations to accept the Noachide Code may be praiseworthy and a part of the command to first reach out for peace, but it is not part of this mitzva - the language is clear. Regarding Amalek, however, the command is to destroy its memory, its progeny, its essence - its name. It would seem that any transformation of someone out of the category of Amalek would fulfil this mitzva of destroying this entity. I would argue, though, that the mitzva can only be fulfilled if the member of Amalek converts to become a Jew. While acceptance of the Noachide Code takes someone out of the category of Amalek and, as such, there is no command to destroy this individual, this acceptance would not utterly destroy the Amalek concept from this world. A subsequent rejection of the Seven Noachide Mitzvot, it would seem, could lead to this individual being re-classified as Amalek. Acceptance of the Noachide Code would simply, as in the case of the Seven Nations, mean there is no command to destroy this individual while he is in this state of a kosher Ben Noach. Amalek, however, is not fully destroyed. Becoming a Jew and receiving that classification, however, is irrevocable. As Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 13:17, even if a convert returns to idolatry, this person is still classified as a Jew. Conversion would destroy the Amalek name and as such would seem to be a method to fulfil this mitzva. 

The irony in this approach to the command is that attempting to do the mitzva in this way, through gerut, would seem to be a full rectification of the original mistake that led to the creation of Amalek. In T.B. Tractate Sanhedrin 99b, we are told that the creation of Amalek was a punishment in that our Avot, Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaacov, did not accept Timna, the mother of Amalek, as a ger. Is it not a Divine paradox in that we may fulfil a mitzva through the conversion of her children? 

The major problem with this approach, however, is the Mechilta, Shemot 17:16, which declares that gerim, converts, from Amalek are not to be accepted. The Mechilta actually seems to imply that even a process of conversion would be inapplicable for David killed the Amalekite convert - a member of Amalek simply cannot convert. Rambam, however, does not codify this law when he discusses those who can or cannot convert in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah, chapter 12. Maimonides' non-acceptance of the Mechilta is further substantiated in that in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:6 he refers to the case of the Amalekite convert as an example of the Jewish king's power of summary judgement. The major issue with the Mechilta actually arises from T.B. Tractate Gittin 57b and Tractate Sanhedrin 96b which declares that the descendants of Haman ( who is considered an Amalekite) learned Torah in B'nei Brak. If Amalekites cannot convert, how could Haman's descendants have become Jews? While some commentators reconcile the Mechilta and the Talmud through maintaining the bar on Amalekite conversion, there are others who declare the Mechilta's position not to be universal. See Torah Shelaima, Parshat Beshalach, section 185 and, for greater detail, Sefer Ner L'Meah. It would seem that Maimonides would be classified within the latter. While converting Amalek may not be an option in fulfilling the mitzva to all, it would seem to be a feasible method according to Rambam, and one that many may find more tenable.

Parsha: Tetzaveh, "Sh'qalim and Zachor"

Question:
When do we read both Parshat Sh'qalim and Parshat Zachor on the very same Shabbat?

Answer:
When Tetzaveh is Zachor - the most common case - we read Sh'qalim at Mincha time.

Shalom,
RRW

Tetzaveh: One Action; Opposite Meanings

From the archives of Nishma's Online Library at http://www.nishma.org/, we have chosen an article that relates to the week's parsha, both to direct you to this dvar Torah but also for the purposes of initiating some discussion.

This week's parsha is Tetzaveh and the topic is the nazir and the kohain. While there is similarity in many of the laws that apply to these two individuals, there are also differences. One, for example, lets his/hair grow, the other has limitations on letting the hair grow -- the term, though, kadosh still applies to both. It would seem that actions may have multiple meanings and that similar meanings may even result from divergent and opposite actions.

 We invite you to further considerate this idea by reading an article on this topic at http://www.nishma.org/articles/insight/insight5761-32.htm.

Parsha: Terumah, Shekalim, "Shekalim vs. Terumah"

originally posted Feb. 14, 2015

What's the difference between Shekalim and the collection in Parshat Terumah?

In Terumah, it's "n'div libbo." That's a free will offering. Sh'qalim is level, "heoshir lo yarbeh..."
L'mah haddavar domeh? To what may this be compared?

T'rumah is like a building fund - everyone gives according to his means, while Sheqalim is like dues, where each gives equally.

Please embellish this and use it to spread some good Torah.

Shalom,
RRW